Rent Sharing with Footloose Production. Foreign Ownership and Wages Revisited.
34 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2014
Date Written: September 16, 2014
Abstract
We present a bargaining model of wage and employment determination, where we show that foreign acquisitions might hurt the bargaining outcome of powerful unions by giving the firm a credible threat to move production abroad. Using detailed data on firms and workers in manufacturing, including information on union membership and foreign ownership, we find, in line with the predictions of our model, that foreign acquisitions negatively impact the outcome of workers in highly unionized plants.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Balsvik, Ragnhild and Sæthre, Morten, Rent Sharing with Footloose Production. Foreign Ownership and Wages Revisited. (September 16, 2014). NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 30/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2515885
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