Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Posted: 8 Jan 2001

See all articles by Robert Innes

Robert Innes

University of Arizona - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract

Laws often encourage violators to self-report their behavior. This paper studies self-reporting enforcement regimes when violators can engage in avoidance activities - activities which lower an offender's risk of apprehension and punishment. Avoidance activities impart two advantages to self-reporting enforcement regimes, over and above advantages identified in prior work. First, self-reporters do not engage in the costly avoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. And second, by avoiding avoidance, self-reporting can sometimes permit the government to deter offenses with less enforcement effort.

Suggested Citation

Innes, Robert D., Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 17, pp. 239-256, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251703

Robert D. Innes (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

1110 E. North Campus Drive
Tucson, AZ 85721-0023
United States
520-621-9741 (Phone)
520-621-6250 (Fax)

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