Foundation Owned Firms in Germany - A Field Experiment for Agency Theory
51 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2014 Last revised: 20 Feb 2015
Date Written: February 19, 2015
Abstract
This paper analyzes the governance and performance of firms which, according to simplistic agency theory, should not be viable. These firms are fully or partially owned by a foundation which itself is not owned by natural or legal persons. Therefore, residual claimholders have restricted or no influence on corporate governance. The lack of owners strengthens other stakeholders, in particular employees. Relative to matching family firms, German foundation owned firms are larger in terms of employees and operating revenue, and substitute labor for material, but not for capital. Their hiring and firing policy is about the same. They follow a more conservative financing policy, their financial performance is somewhat weaker.
Keywords: foundation owned firms, agency theory, corporate finance, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G35, L25
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