52 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2014 Last revised: 13 Jul 2016
Date Written: July 12, 2016
This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a hand-collected dataset of largely exogenous legal changes we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power.
Keywords: hostile takeovers, corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, laws
JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cain, Matthew D. and McKeon, Stephen B. and Davidoff Solomon, Steven, Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers (July 12, 2016). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517513
By Albert Choi