Venture Capital and Career Concerns

43 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2014 Last revised: 15 Nov 2017

See all articles by Nicholas Crain

Nicholas Crain

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 09, 2017

Abstract

This paper finds evidence that the market for follow-on capital discourages risk taking by venture capital fund managers. The amount of follow-on capital raised by venture capitalists is concave with respect to current fund performance. In addition, managers with less consistent performance are slower, and less likely, to raise a follow-on fund. Venture capitalists adjust their investment strategy to balance fundraising incentives against the incentive to pursue risk provided by carried interest. The findings are consistent with models of career concerns, where an agent’s compensation is designed to (partially) offset the implicit incentives created by future employment opportunities.

Keywords: Venture Capital, Career Concerns, Agency Problems, Risk Shifting

JEL Classification: G24

Suggested Citation

Crain, Nicholas, Venture Capital and Career Concerns (November 09, 2017). Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper No. 2517640. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2517640 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517640

Nicholas Crain (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Parkville, Victoria 3010 3010
Australia

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