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Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?

23 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2014  

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marcel P. Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: November 3, 2014

Abstract

When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other's preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development mechanism (CDM) for the likelihood of such failure. The CDM has been introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protokol to allow countries to make efficiency enhancing use of cross-country low-cost mitigation opportunities. We use a simple bargaining framework to uncover why this mechanism may reduce the likelihood for reaching an efficient cooperative climate agreement.

Keywords: clean development mechanism, international climate agreements, bargaining, incomplete information

JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, F53, H41

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Thum, Marcel P., Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements? (November 3, 2014). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2014 - 20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2518349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518349

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Marcel Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

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