Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

70 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2014

See all articles by Mikhail Golosov

Mikhail Golosov

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Luigi Iovino

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: October 2014

Abstract

We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting to the worst perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We construct a recursive problem that characterizes the resource allocation and information revelation on the Pareto frontier of the set of PBE. We prove a version of the Revelation Principle and find an upper bound on the maximum number of messages that are needed to achieve the optimal allocation. Agents play mixed strategies over that message set to limit the amount of information transmitted to the government. The central feature of the optimal contract is that agents who enter the period with low implicitly-promised lifetime utilities reveal no information to the government and receive no insurance against current period shock, while agents with high promised utilities reveal precise information about their current shock and receive insurance as in economies with full commitment by the government.

Suggested Citation

Golosov, Mikhail and Iovino, Luigi, Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment (October 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20633. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2518723

Mikhail Golosov (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

111 Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Luigi Iovino

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

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