Power Indices When Players Can Commit to Reject Coalitions

19 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2014

See all articles by Laszlo A. Koczy

Laszlo A. Koczy

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS); Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

Date Written: November 4, 2014

Abstract

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a model where players can reject certain partnerships in cooperation. For normalised indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well defined if power is measured by an index that takes only minimal winning coalitions into account.

Keywords: quarrelling, rejected coalitions, a priori voting power, power indices, minimal winning coalitions, rational players

JEL Classification: C71, D71

Suggested Citation

Koczy, Laszlo A., Power Indices When Players Can Commit to Reject Coalitions (November 4, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519271 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2519271

Laszlo A. Koczy (Contact Author)

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS) ( email )

Budaörsi 45
Budapest, H-1112
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.mtakti.hu/en/kutatok/laszlo-a-koczy/276/

Quantitative Social and Management Sciences Research Group, Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )

Magyar Tudósok krt. 2.
Budapest, 1117
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://qsms.mokk.bme.hu/index.php/koczy/

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