Using Bid Data for the Management of Sequential, Multi-Unit, Online Auctions With Uniformly Distributed Bidders Valuations

39 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2000

See all articles by Edieal J. Pinker

Edieal J. Pinker

Yale School of Management

Abraham Seidmann

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; University of Rochester - Simon Business School

Yaniv Vakrat

McKinsey & Company

Date Written: June 8, 2007

Abstract

Internet auctions for consumers' goods are an increasingly popular selling venue. Many sellers, instead of offering their entire inventory in a single auction, split it into sequential auctions of smaller lots, thereby reducing the negative market impact of large lots. Information technology also makes it possible to collect and analyze detailed bid data from online auctions. In this paper, we develop and test a new model of sequential online auctions to explore the potential benefits of using real bid data from earlier auctions to improve the management of future auctions.

Assuming a truth-revealing auction model, we quantify the effect of the lot size on the closing price. We then develop a model for allocating inventory across multiple auctions that dynamically incorporates the results of previous auctions as feedback into the management of subsequent auctions, updating the lot size and number of auctions. We demonstrate that information signals from previous auctions can be used to update the auctioneer's beliefs about the customers' valuation distribution, and then to significantly increase the seller's profit potential. We use several examples to show how the benefits of using detailed transaction data for the management of sequential, multi-unit, online auctions are influenced by the inventory holding costs, the number of bidders, and the dispersion of consumers' valuations.

Keywords: Information Technology, Information Systems, Internet, Auctions, Dynamic Programming

Suggested Citation

Pinker, Edieal J. and Seidmann, Abraham Avi and Vakrat, Yaniv, Using Bid Data for the Management of Sequential, Multi-Unit, Online Auctions With Uniformly Distributed Bidders Valuations (June 8, 2007). Simon School, University of Rochester, Research Paper Series, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.251958

Edieal J. Pinker

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-436-8867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://som.yale.edu/faculty/edieal-j-pinker

Abraham Avi Seidmann

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

University of Rochester - Simon Business School ( email )

Carol Simon Hall 3-333C
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-5694 (Phone)
585-275-9331 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssb.rochester.edu/fac/Seidmannav/

Yaniv Vakrat (Contact Author)

McKinsey & Company

3075-A Hansen Way
Palo Alto, CA 94304
United States

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