Institutional Ownership and Conservatism

Abstract

Prior studies have examined whether conservatism acts as a compliment or a supplement to corporate governance. One argument is that firms with better corporate governance exhibit greater accounting conservatism because of the corporate governance. The other possibility is that conservatism is demanded in the absence of other forms of corporate governance. This study adds to that line of literature by examining the effect of institutional ownership on accounting conservatism. Specifically, we test whether firms with less institutional ownership exhibit more or less accounting conservatism. Consistent with the argument that greater corporate governance leads to more accounting conservatism, our results indicate a higher degree of conservatism in high-institutional ownership settings, consistent with a complimentary relationship between the monitoring from institutional ownership and conservatism. This finding contributes to the debate over why accounting conservatism occurs by finding an increased level of conservatism in firms with better corporate governance.

JEL Classification: G3