Healthcare and Federalism: A Political Economy Approach

Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 4, pages 39-78, October-D.

31 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2014

Date Written: October 1, 2012

Abstract

Decisions over public healthcare are very intertwined with national political debates. The aim of this work is to analyze the features of public healthcare with the tools of political economy. When the provision is not redistributive, a coalition of middle income voters will be opposed by poorer and richer individuals. When taxation and healthcare provision are decentralized to regions, which differ among themselves in terms of income distribution, two effects are in action on the equilibrium level of healthcare spending: a income effect and a inequality effect. The latter effect will be the strongest if the system is not redistributive.

Keywords: Healthcare, Federalism, Redistribution, Inequality

JEL Classification: H42, H51, H75, I14

Suggested Citation

Biasi, Barbara, Healthcare and Federalism: A Political Economy Approach (October 1, 2012). Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 4, pages 39-78, October-D. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2520959

Barbara Biasi (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

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