A Domino Theory of Regionalism

23 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2001 Last revised: 15 Sep 2022

See all articles by Richard E. Baldwin

Richard E. Baldwin

University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 1993

Abstract

Regional liberalization sweeps the globe like wildfire while multilateral trade talks proceed at a glacial pace. Why are countries eager to liberalize regionally but reluctant to do so multilaterally? The answer of the GATT-is-dead school is that multilateralism is too cumbersome for contemporary trade issues. This paper proposes a very different answer. Recent regionalism is caused by two idiosyncratic events multiplied by a domino effect. The triggering events – the U.S.-Mexico FTA and the EC's 1992 programme – had nothing to do with GATT's health. The domino effect is simple. Political equilibria, which balance anti- and pro-membership forces, determine governments' stances on regional liberalization. Domestic exporters to regional blocs are a powerful pro-membership constituency. An event that triggers closer integration within an existing bloc harms the profits of nonmember exporters, thus stimulating them to boost their pro-membership political activity. The extra activity alters the political equilibrium, leading some countries to join. This enlargement further harms nonmember exporters since they now face a disadvantage in a greater number of markets. This second round effect brings forth more pro-membership political activity and a further enlargement of the bloc. The new political equilibrium is marked by larger regional trading blocs. In the meantime regionalism appears to spread like wildfire.

Suggested Citation

Baldwin, Richard E., A Domino Theory of Regionalism (September 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4465, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=252201

Richard E. Baldwin (Contact Author)

University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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