An Extension of the Tiebout Hypothesis of Voting with One's Feet: The Medicaid Magnet Hypothesis

Posted: 12 Nov 2014

See all articles by J. R. Clark

J. R. Clark

The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Richard J. Cebula

Armstrong Atlantic State University; Jacksonville University (Florida)

Date Written: November 2013

Abstract

This study empirically extends the Tiebout hypothesis of ‘voting with one’s feet’ in two ways. First, it provides updated estimates using net migration data for the period 2000-2008. Second, in addition to investigating variables reflecting public education outlays, property taxation and income taxation, it investigates whether migrants are attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. The latter hypothesis is referred to as the ‘Medicaid magnet hypothesis’. The analysis includes three economic variables, three quality of life variables and three Tiebout-type factors in addition to Medicaid benefits. Results indicate that consumer voters were attracted to states with higher per pupil public school spending, lower property and income tax rates, and that certain consumer-voters may be attracted to states that offer higher levels of Medicaid benefits.

Keywords: Migration, Tiebout Hypothesis, Medicaid, Medicaid Magnet Hypothesis

JEL Classification: D72, D12, D79, H71, H72, R23

Suggested Citation

Clark, Jeff R. and Cebula, Richard J., An Extension of the Tiebout Hypothesis of Voting with One's Feet: The Medicaid Magnet Hypothesis (November 2013). Applied Economics, Vol. 45, No. 32, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2522473

Jeff R. Clark (Contact Author)

The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga ( email )

Department of Economics
Suite 313 Fletcher Hall
Chattanooga, TN 37403-2598
United States

Richard J. Cebula

Armstrong Atlantic State University ( email )

11935 Abercorn Street
Savannah, GA 31419
912-921-3781 (Phone)
912-921-3782 (Fax)

Jacksonville University (Florida) ( email )

Jacksonville, FL 32211
United States

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