Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2522919
 


 



Economic Messianism and Constitutional Power in a 'German Europe': All Courts are Equal, But Some Courts are More Equal than Others


Michael A. Wilkinson


London School of Economics - Law Department

November 11, 2014

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 26/2014

Abstract:     
Since the financial crisis there have been extraordinary efforts by the European Central Bank to protect the single currency, alongside pronouncements by European political elites that the Euro determines Europe’s fate and must be rescued at any cost. In its OMT reference, the German constitutional court challenges this emerging ‘Economic Messianism’ on the basis of a constitutional logic of the democratic Rechtsstaat. And yet, the German Court is also promoting an ordo-liberal logic of avoidance of moral hazard, fiscal competitiveness and austerity that undermines the project of European integration and erodes constitutional democracy in the debtor states. These tensions – between supranational economic integration, state sovereignty and domestic constitutionalism – reveal the depth of the constitutional disequilibrium in the EU, and also reflect broader contradictions in the development of late democratic capitalism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34


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Date posted: December 9, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Wilkinson, Michael A., Economic Messianism and Constitutional Power in a 'German Europe': All Courts are Equal, But Some Courts are More Equal than Others (November 11, 2014). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 26/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2522919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2522919

Contact Information

Michael A. Wilkinson (Contact Author)
London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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