Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach
58 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2000
Date Written: October 16, 2003
Abstract
We provide a direct estimate of the magnitude of agency costs in publicly-held corporations. We compute an explicit performance benchmark that compares a firm's actual Tobin's Q to the Q* of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm having the same inputs and characteristics as the original firm. The Q of the average sample firm is around 16% below its Q*, equivalent to a $1,432 million reduction in its potential market value. We relate the shortfall in value to the incentives provided to CEOs. Boards appear to grant CEOs too few shares and too many options which are insufficiently sensitive to firm risk.
JEL Classification: G32 G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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