35 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2014 Last revised: 9 Dec 2014
Date Written: December 8, 2014
Many of the leading controversies in competition policy in the last two decades, especially those surrounding the Microsoft case, reflect the challenges posed by platform industries. Unfortunately, too often economists and policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons when thinking about such industries. Central to our analysis is a more realistic view of the process of consumer coordination. Platforms often use “usage revenue later” strategies to ensure that consumers coordinate on their platform. This greatly mitigates the possibility of inefficient lock-in or excessive dominance by a leading platform, but it makes inefficient fragmentation a greater danger. Thus regulation, rather than competition policy, may be more appropriate in addressing potential market failures arising in platform industries.
Keywords: platforms, network effects, lock-in, fragmentation, excessive entry, winner-takes-all, heterogeneity
JEL Classification: D42, K21, L12, L43, L51, L86, L96
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Weyl, E. Glen and White, Alexander, Let the Right 'One' Win: Policy Lessons from the New Economics of Platforms (December 8, 2014). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 709. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2524368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2524368