Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Guerriero, Carmine (2015), ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules,’ 35(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 543-574

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2014-04

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2014-57

44 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2014 Last revised: 3 Nov 2015

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School

Carmine Guerriero

Department of Economics, University of Bologna

Date Written: January 12, 2015

Abstract

A key question in comparative law is why different legal systems provide different legal solutions for the same problem. To answer this question, we use novel comparative evidence on how the conflict between the dispossessed original owner and the bona fide purchaser of a stolen good is resolved in different countries. This is the most primitive manifestation of a fundamental legal choice: the balance between the protection of the owner’s property rights and the enhancement of the buyer’s reliance on contracts. We test four prominent theories: functional equivalence, legal origins, political economics, and cultural economics. We find that a culture of self-reliance is the key determinant of comparative variation in this area of law.

Keywords: culture, comparative variation, legal origins, functional equivalence, good faith purchase

JEL Classification: K11, K12, K40, Z10

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Guerriero, Carmine, Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules (January 12, 2015). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2014-04; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Guerriero, Carmine (2015), ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules,’ 35(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 543-574; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2014-04; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2014-57. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526060

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/giuseppe-dari-mattiacci

Carmine Guerriero

Department of Economics, University of Bologna ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

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