The Institutionalization of the Party System in Russia: Opportunities and Threats at the Elections of Governors

25 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2014

See all articles by Yuriy Guyvoronskiy

Yuriy Guyvoronskiy

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Svetlana Karandashova

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Elena Sirotkina

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Anastasia Shishorina

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: November 17, 2014

Abstract

Does the level of party system institutionalization influence high-level incumbents’ electoral support within subnational authoritarianism? Is it possible to ensure incumbent electoral success only with manipulative electoral practices? To what extent does this and other factors contribute to the incumbents’ landslide victory? Contrary to scholarly thought in this field, this paper argues that manipulative practices are not the only determinant of incumbents’ electoral success in an authoritarian regime. They are also insufficient. The research is based on the results Russian gubernatorial elections in 2012-2013.

Keywords: party system institutionalization, incumbent, electoral authoritarianism, governor elections, regional regimes

JEL Classification: D72.

Suggested Citation

Guyvoronskiy, Yuriy and Karandashova, Svetlana and Sirotkina, Elena and Shishorina, Anastasia, The Institutionalization of the Party System in Russia: Opportunities and Threats at the Elections of Governors (November 17, 2014). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 17/PS/2014 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526107

Yuriy Guyvoronskiy

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Svetlana Karandashova

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Elena Sirotkina

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Anastasia Shishorina (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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