Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526182
 


 



Policy Limits, Payouts, and Blood Money: Medical Malpractice Settlements in the Shadow of Insurance


Charles Silver


University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

David A. Hyman


Georgetown University

Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Myungho Paik


Hanyang University - College of Policy Science

November 17, 2014

5 UC Irvine Law Review 559-586 (2015)
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-20
University of Texas School of Law Paper No. 567

Abstract:     
In prior research, we found that policy limits in Texas medical malpractice (“med mal”) cases often served as de facto caps on recoveries in both tried and settled cases. We also found that physicians faced little personal exposure on malpractice claims. Out-of-pocket payments (OOPPs) by physicians were rare and usually small. Physicians could reduce their personal exposure to near zero by carrying $1 million in primary coverage ― a standard amount in many states. Finally, the real amount of insurance coverage purchased by physicians with paid claims declined substantially over 1988–1999, consistent with physicians learning over time how low the OOPP risk was and deciding to carry less coverage.

We now revisit our findings, using an extended dataset (1988–2005) that lets us study policies purchased through 2003, which encompasses the period during which Texas experienced a med mal insurance crisis (1999–2003) and adopted tort reform to limit med mal lawsuits (2003). Our updated findings are largely consistent with our original findings: policy limits continue to cap recoveries; physicians still rarely make OOPPs; most OOPPs are modest; and real policy limits continue to shrink. We also find evidence that, at the end of the extended period, physicians often purchased less coverage (i.e., policies with limits of $100,000–$200,000 instead of $500,000–$1 million).

Our findings have important policy implications. If physicians carry less real coverage over time, lawsuits should become less profitable. This will make it harder for injured patients to find plaintiffs’ lawyers willing to handle their cases; shift the cost of medical injuries away from providers and toward patients and first-party health insurers; weaken liability insurers’ incentives to monitor providers; and diminish the (already modest) deterrent effect of tort law. If these findings are representative, they may help explain the nationwide decline in med mal claiming that we document elsewhere. Finally, our findings raise questions about the explanatory power of Baker’s “blood money” norm, at least for med mal litigation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Blood Money, Policy Limits, Med Mal, Personal Exposure

JEL Classification: K13, K41


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: September 22, 2016 ; Last revised: December 16, 2016

Suggested Citation

Silver, Charles and Hyman, David A. and Black, Bernard S. and Paik, Myungho, Policy Limits, Payouts, and Blood Money: Medical Malpractice Settlements in the Shadow of Insurance (November 17, 2014). 5 UC Irvine Law Review 559-586 (2015); Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-20; University of Texas School of Law Paper No. 567. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526182

Contact Information

Charles M. Silver
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-232-1337 (Phone)
512-232-1372 (Fax)

David A. Hyman
Georgetown University ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
Myungho Paik
Hanyang University - College of Policy Science ( email )
222 Wangsimni-ro Seongdong-gu
Seoul, 04763
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 246
Downloads: 56
Download Rank: 296,796