Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking:Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks
53 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2014
There are 4 versions of this paper
Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks
Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks
Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks
Date Written: October 2014
Abstract
We use payroll data on 1.2 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sector to identify incentive pay in the critical banking segments of treasury/capital market management and investment banking for 66 banks. We document an economically significant correlation of incentive pay with both the level and volatility of bank trading income particularly for the pre-crisis period 2003-7 for which incentive pay was strongest. This result is robust if we instrument the bonus share in the capital markets divisions with the strength of incentive pay in unrelated bank divisions like retail banking. Moreover, pre-crisis incentive pay appears too strong for an optimal trade-off between trading income and risk which maximizes the NPV of trading income.
Keywords: Bank Risk, Bonus Payments, Incentive Pay, Trading Income
JEL Classification: D22, G20, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Matthias Efing (Contact Author)
HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )
France
(++33)695646755 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://matthiasefing.com/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Swiss Finance Institute
Switzerland
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany