Quantile Stable Mechanisms

22 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last revised: 26 May 2015

See all articles by Peter Chen

Peter Chen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Michael Egesdal

Airbnb

Marek Pycia

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Date Written: April 2015

Abstract

We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. This last result is of independent interest as experiments show that agents who match in a decentralized way tend to coordinate on the median stable matching when it exists.

Keywords: matching with contracts, quantile stable mechanisms, preference ranking

JEL Classification: C71, C78

Suggested Citation

Chen, Peter and Egesdal, Michael and Pycia, Marek and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Quantile Stable Mechanisms (April 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526505

Peter Chen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Michael Egesdal

Airbnb ( email )

888 Brannan St
San Francisco, CA 94103
United States

Marek Pycia (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
28
Abstract Views
501
PlumX Metrics