Target Firm Advertising and Firm Value
57 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last revised: 3 Jan 2019
Date Written: December 18, 2018
Appendix is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304137
Consistent with hypotheses regarding firm advertising, we find that targets with pre-takeover advertising obtain higher premiums, while acquirers earn lower announcement returns. These economically significant effects suggest that, through advertising, targets increase their profile and negotiating power. Further, targets that advertise are more likely to initiate their takeovers, attract multiple bidders, receive revised increased bids, capture more merger rents, and even in failed acquisitions, experience a 1% permanent revaluation. The latter result differentiates between information asymmetry and behavioral explanations for the target advertising. Overall the results support the hypothesis that management advertises to transmit information to investors and potential acquirers.
Keywords: Advertising; Mergers and acquisitions; Information transmission, Behavioral bias
JEL Classification: D03; G02; G14; G34; M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation