Download This PaperManipulability of Stable Mechanisms
17 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last revised: 3 Feb 2015
Date Written: January 2015
Abstract
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.
Keywords: matching with contract, manipulability, preference ranking, stable mechanism
JEL Classification: C71, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chen, Peter and Egesdal, Michael and Pycia, Marek and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms (January 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526596
Peter Chen
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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