Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

17 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last revised: 3 Feb 2015

See all articles by Peter Chen

Peter Chen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Michael Egesdal

Airbnb

Marek Pycia

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Date Written: January 2015

Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.

Keywords: matching with contract, manipulability, preference ranking, stable mechanism

JEL Classification: C71, C78

Suggested Citation

Chen, Peter and Egesdal, Michael and Pycia, Marek and Yenmez, M. Bumin, Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms (January 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2526596

Peter Chen

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Michael Egesdal

Airbnb ( email )

888 Brannan St
San Francisco, CA 94103
United States

Marek Pycia (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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