Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations

20 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2014

See all articles by Emanuele Tarantino

Emanuele Tarantino

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2015

Abstract

The standard setting organizations’ decisions on licensing policy and standard’s technological specification, and the ensuing implications for social welfare are analyzed. The author finds the conditions under which a licensing rule that grants monopoly power to the licensors whose technology is adopted in the standard can be employed by the members of the consortium (ex-post licensing). Moreover, it is shown that the adoption of ex-post licensing might lead to the inefficient exclusion of an efficient stand-alone licensor. Finally, the author discusses the conditions under which a policy of ex-ante licensing can be less efficient than ex-post licensing.

JEL Classification: K21, L15, L24, L42

Suggested Citation

Tarantino, Emanuele, Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations (January 2015). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, Issue 1, pp. 604-623, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2528806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12112

Emanuele Tarantino (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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