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Wolf Pack ActivismAlon BravDuke University - Fuqua School of Business Amil DasguptaLondon School of Economics (LSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Richmond D. MathewsUniversity of Maryland - Department of Finance September 2016 Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 2529230 Abstract: Blockholder monitoring is key to good corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare. As a result mechanisms that enable small blockholders to exert collective influence are important. It is alleged that institutional blockholders (implicitly) coordinate when intervening in firms, with one acting as the “lead” activist and others as peripheral activists, or “wolf pack” members. We present a model of wolf pack activism. Our model formalizes a source of complementarity across the engagement strategies of activists and highlights the catalytic role played by the leader. We also characterize share acquisition by wolf pack members and the leader, providing testable implications on ownership and price dynamics in wolf pack formation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53 JEL Classification: G34 Date posted: November 23, 2014 ; Last revised: September 23, 2016Suggested CitationContact Information
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