Does Management Matter in Schools?

57 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2014

See all articles by Nicholas Bloom

Nicholas Bloom

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Renata Lemos

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Raffaella Sadun

Harvard University - Strategy Unit; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

John Van Reenen

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Stanford Graduate School of Business; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

We collect data on operations, targets and human resources management practices in over 1,800 schools educating 15-year-olds in eight countries. Overall, we show that higher management quality is strongly associated with better educational outcomes. The UK, Sweden, Canada and the US obtain the highest management scores closely followed by Germany, with a gap to Italy, Brazil and then finally India. We also show that autonomous government schools (i.e. government funded but with substantial independence like UK academies and US charters) have significantly higher management scores than regular government schools and private schools. Almost half of the difference between the management scores of autonomous government schools and regular government schools is accounted for by differences in leadership of the principal and better governance.

Keywords: management, pupil achievement, autonomy, principals

JEL Classification: L2, M2, I2

Suggested Citation

Bloom, Nicholas and Lemos, Renata and Sadun, Raffaella and Van Reenen, John Michael, Does Management Matter in Schools?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8620. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529329

Nicholas Bloom (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://economics.stanford.edu/faculty/bloom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Renata Lemos

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

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Raffaella Sadun

Harvard University - Strategy Unit ( email )

Harvard Business School
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HOME PAGE: http://people.hbs.edu/rsadun

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/staff/person.asp?id=1758

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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John Michael Van Reenen

London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

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Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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