Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity Capital: A Cross-Sectional Study on Bangladesh

34 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2014 Last revised: 17 Sep 2017

See all articles by Faizul Haque

Faizul Haque

Edinburgh Business School

Thankom Gopinath Arun

University of Central Lancashire

Colin Kirkpatrick

University of Manchester - Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM)

Date Written: November 23, 2014

Abstract

This article investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on the cost of equity capital to firms in Bangladesh. Agency theory suggests that better corporate governance reduces agency costs and improves investors’ confidence, which in turn reduces the rate of return on stock expected by the investors, leading to lower cost of equity capital to the firm. This article uses a corporate governance index (CGI), comprising the five dimensions - ownership structure, shareholder rights, independence and responsibilities of the board and management, financial reporting and disclosures, and responsibility towards the stakeholders. The empirical results tend to be inconclusive. Whilst a firm’s governance quality is positively associated with CAPM-based KE and geometric average stock returns, it is inversely related with the dividend yields (for the dividend paying firms). Given the considerable agency costs in the majority of the firms of developing economies, this article recognizes a strong governance role for legal and regulatory institutions in removing the governance malfunctions at both firm level and operational level of the capital market.

Keywords: Corporate governance, agency theory, cost of equity, Bangladesh

JEL Classification: G10, G30, G38, O17

Suggested Citation

Haque, Faizul and Arun, Thankom Gopinath and Kirkpatrick, Colin, Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity Capital: A Cross-Sectional Study on Bangladesh (November 23, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529654 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2529654

Faizul Haque (Contact Author)

Edinburgh Business School ( email )

Riccarton
Edinburgh, Scotland EH14 4AS
United Kingdom

Thankom Gopinath Arun

University of Central Lancashire ( email )

United Kingdom

Colin Kirkpatrick

University of Manchester - Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) ( email )

Manchester M13 9GH
United Kingdom
0161 275 2808 (Phone)
0161 273 8829 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
743
PlumX Metrics