Global Environmental Agreements and International Trade: Asymmetry of Countries Matters

35 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2014

See all articles by Thomas Eichner

Thomas Eichner

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines

Rudiger Pethig

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: November 24, 2014

Abstract

We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by considering countries that are identical within each of two groups but differ across groups with respect to climate damage or fossil fuel demand. Our numerical analysis suggests that climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of fuel demand asymmetry. If fuel is sufficiently scarce, low degrees of fuel demand asymmetry discourage cooperation whereas higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition.

Keywords: fuel demand, climate damage, international trade, asymmetry, stability, grand coalition

JEL Classification: C720, F020, Q500, Q580

Suggested Citation

Eichner, Thomas and Pethig, Rudiger, Global Environmental Agreements and International Trade: Asymmetry of Countries Matters (November 24, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5051. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529890

Thomas Eichner

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines ( email )

Hoelderlinstrasse 3
57068 Siegen
Germany

Rudiger Pethig (Contact Author)

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines ( email )

Hoelderlinstrasse 3
57068 Siegen
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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