Competing over a Finite Number of Locations

Economic Theory Bulletin 4, 125–136.

14 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2014 Last revised: 2 Jan 2018

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Marco Scarsini

LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza

Date Written: January 9, 2015

Abstract

We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations. Consumers have strict preferences over the possible available store locations and retailers aim to attract the maximum number of consumers. We prove that a pure strategy equilibrium exists if the number of retailers is large enough. Moreover, as the number of retailers grows large, in equilibrium the distribution of retailers over the locations converges to the distribution of consumers' preferences.

Keywords: Hotelling games, pure equilibria, large games, political economy

JEL Classification: C72, R30, R39

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Scarsini, Marco, Competing over a Finite Number of Locations (January 9, 2015). Economic Theory Bulletin 4, 125–136., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2529979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2529979

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Marco Scarsini

LUISS, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, RM 00197
Italy

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