Competition Policy and Cartel Size

International Economic Review, Forthcoming

29 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2014

See all articles by Iwan Bos

Iwan Bos

Maastricht University

Joseph E. Harrington Jr

University of Pennsylvania

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 16, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.

Suggested Citation

Bos, Iwan and Harrington Jr, Joseph E., Competition Policy and Cartel Size (January 16, 2014). International Economic Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530574

Iwan Bos

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands

Joseph E. Harrington Jr (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19102
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
70
Abstract Views
748
rank
436,579
PlumX Metrics