Powersharing, Protection, and Peace

Journal of Politics (Forthcoming)

38 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2014 Last revised: 19 Jun 2017

Scott Gates

Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) ; University of Oslo

Benjamin A. T. Graham

University of Southern California - School of International Relations

Yonatan Lupu

George Washington University - Department of Political Science

Havard Strand

University of Oslo

Kaare Strom

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Date Written: September 17, 2015

Abstract

Powersharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of powersharing -- inclusive, dispersive, and constraining -- and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining powersharing institutions. such as guarantees of civil liberties and independent judiciaries to protect them, create checks against governmental repression of minority groups and ordinary citizens, whereas other types of powersharing focus on political elites. Constraining powersharing institutions limit incentives for mass mobilization and raise the costs of conflict, thus reducing the probability of civil war. Drawing on a new global data set, we examine the effects of powersharing on the onset and recurrence of civil war. In contrast to prior findings, our results show that only constraining powersharing institutions have a pacific effect.

Suggested Citation

Gates, Scott and Graham, Benjamin A. T. and Lupu, Yonatan and Strand, Havard and Strøm, Kaare, Powersharing, Protection, and Peace (September 17, 2015). Journal of Politics (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2531124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2531124

Scott Gates

Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) ( email )

N-0260 Oslo
Norway
+472547732 (Phone)
+4722547701 (Fax)

University of Oslo

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

Benjamin A. T. Graham (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - School of International Relations ( email )

3518 Trousdale Parkway
VKC 330
Los Angeles, CA California 90089-0043
United States
8586996306 (Phone)
2137420281 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://dornsife.usc.edu/graham

Yonatan Lupu

George Washington University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Washington, DC 20052
United States

Havard Strand

University of Oslo ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

Kaare Strøm

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

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