29 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2014 Last revised: 6 Jan 2017
Date Written: January 04, 2017
When prospect theory (PT) is applied in a dynamic context, the probability weighting component brings new challenges. We study PT agents facing optimal timing decisions and consider the impact of allowing them to follow randomized strategies. In a continuous-time model of gambling and optimal stopping, Ebert and Strack (2015) show that a naive PT investor with access only to pure strategies never stops. We show that allowing randomization can significantly alter the predictions of their model, and can result in voluntary cessation of gambling.
Keywords: Behavioral economics, prospect theory, probability weighting, randomized strategies
JEL Classification: D03, D81, G02
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Henderson, Vicky and Hobson, David and Tse, Alex S. L., Randomized Strategies and Prospect Theory in a Dynamic Context (January 04, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2531457 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2531457
By Vipin Veetil