Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity?

70 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2014 Last revised: 9 Feb 2025

See all articles by Johan Hombert

Johan Hombert

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Antoinette Schoar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David Alexandre Sraer

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Thesmar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

We study a large-scale French reform that provided generous downside insurance for unemployed individuals starting a business. We study whether this reform affects the composition of people who are drawn into entrepreneurship. New firms started in response to the reform are, on average, smaller, but have similar growth expectations and education levels compared to start-ups before the reform. They are also as likely to survive or to hire. In aggregate, the effect of the reform on employment is largely offset by large crowd-out effects. However, because new firms are more productive, the reform has the impact of raising aggregate productivity. These results suggest that the dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities is small in the data, so that the facilitation of entry leads to sizable Schumpeterian dynamics at the firm-level.

Suggested Citation

Hombert, Johan and Schoar, Antoinette and Sraer, David Alexandre and Thesmar, David, Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? (November 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20717, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532298

Johan Hombert (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
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France

Antoinette Schoar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02142
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617-253-3763 (Phone)
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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David Alexandre Sraer

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

David Thesmar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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