Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick

Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2532684

100 Iowa Law Review 2115 (2015)

18 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2014 Last revised: 23 Apr 2020

See all articles by Mark A. Lemley

Mark A. Lemley

Stanford Law School

Christopher R. Leslie

University of California, Irvine School of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2014

Abstract

For nearly forty years, since the Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick, federal antitrust law has prevented indirect purchasers from complaining of overcharges caused by antitrust violations. The Court reasoned that direct purchasers are the best and most motivated antitrust plaintiffs. But in its 2013 Italian Colors decision, the Court made it extremely difficult for direct purchasers to bring an antitrust claim in federal court. In doing so, it undermined the policy rationale for Illinois Brick, opening the way for courts to reconsider the ban on antitrust enforcement by indirect purchasers.

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A. and Leslie, Christopher R., Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick (December 1, 2014). Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2532684, 100 Iowa Law Review 2115 (2015), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2532684

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Christopher R. Leslie

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Drive, Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-1000
United States
949-824-5556 (Phone)

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