Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy

37 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2014

See all articles by Jesús Moraga

Jesús Moraga

Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA)

Hillel Rapoport

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Stanford University

Date Written: November 28, 2014

Abstract

The current EU Asylum policy is widely seen as ineffective and unfair. We propose an EU-wide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum-seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries’ and migrants’ preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta (EUREMA) program.

Keywords: immigration policy, EU policy, tradable quotas, refugee resettlement, asylum seekers, international public goods

JEL Classification: F220, F500, H870, I300, K330, O190

Suggested Citation

Moraga, Jesús and Rapoport, Hillel, Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (November 28, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5072. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2532910

Jesús Moraga

Foundation for Applied Economic Research (FEDEA) ( email )

Jorge Juan 46
Madrid, 28001
Spain

Hillel Rapoport (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

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