An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs

Forthcoming in Jennifer Arlen, ed., Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing (Edward Elgar 2015)

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-39

22 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2014 Last revised: 28 May 2015

Date Written: December 3, 2014

Abstract

Tests for “effective” compliance programs take the form of lists specifying required elements in varying level of detail. From an economic perspective, an effective compliance program can be defined more fundamentally as the set of policies and procedures that a rational, profit-maximizing firm would establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social costs of violations. This paper explores the idea and several of its extensions and qualifications.

Suggested Citation

Miller, Geoffrey P., An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs (December 3, 2014). Forthcoming in Jennifer Arlen, ed., Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing (Edward Elgar 2015); NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-39. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2533661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533661

Geoffrey P. Miller (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

Center for the Study of Central Banks
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6329 (Phone)
212-995-4590 (Fax)

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