Self-Disclosure and Selection Bias in Studies of Amt- Motivated Behavior

Posted: 5 Dec 1998

See all articles by Gil B. Manzon, Jr.

Gil B. Manzon, Jr.

Boston College

George A. Plesko

University of Connecticut School of Business

Date Written: November 1995

Abstract

This study provides evidence on the characteristics associated with the completeness of corporate tax reporting by firms subject to the AMT. We find disclosure of tax status is contingent upon the potential costs and benefits of the disclosure. In particular, the variables that are significant in explaining the disclosure decision are consistent with the argument that firms use disclosure to pursue their own political and competitive goals. Further, we demonstrate that relying solely on self-disclosed AMT status in a study of earnings management can lead to results substantially different from those obtained using the actual AMT status of the firm. Obtaining the paper: This paper is available in WordPerfect 5.1 and Rich Text Format (RTF) for anonymous FTP transfer at: omer.cba.neu.edu After login (username anonymous and your internet address as password) change to the subdirectory wpaper. The file names are man_ple.rtf and "man_ple.w51".

JEL Classification: M4, H2, G3

Suggested Citation

Manzon, Gil B. and Plesko, George A., Self-Disclosure and Selection Bias in Studies of Amt- Motivated Behavior (November 1995). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534

Gil B. Manzon

Boston College ( email )

Chestnut Hill, MA 02167
United States

George A. Plesko (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut School of Business ( email )

School of Business
Storrs, CT 06269-2041
United States
860-486-6421 (Phone)

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