A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation

26 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2014

See all articles by Steven Shavell

Steven Shavell

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2014

Abstract

The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is — implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.

Keywords: Crime, deterrence, incapacitation

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Shavell, Steven, A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation (December 2014). International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2534579

Steven Shavell (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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