Equality Regimes Compared: France's Political and Corporate Quotas

18 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2014

See all articles by Darren Rosenblum

Darren Rosenblum

Pace Law School; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law

Date Written: December 2014

Abstract

This article differentiates parity, the French political quota from the French Corporate Board Quota. Further, the article articulates how an examination of political quotas after the corporate board quota was passed could be beneficial in reexamining and reformatting political quotas. Both share the goal of increasing representation of women. The French political quota preceded the Corporate Board Quota and was relatively unsuccessful, which may have led to the difference in the implementation of the Corporate Board Quota. The paper concludes that the Corporate Board Quotas is both more modest and stronger than the political board quotas. More modest because the focus of the remedy is on the board and not the executive committee, which is a less powerful institution within the corporate governance structure. The Corporate Board Quota is stronger because they mandate seats and not merely candidacies. There are advantages to the focus within the corporate context of different sites of governance and different ways to affect governance which suggest other mechanisms for political equality regimes.

Keywords: Quota, France, Political, Corporate, Board of Directors, Gender, Representation

Suggested Citation

Rosenblum, Darren, Equality Regimes Compared: France's Political and Corporate Quotas (December 2014). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. 2014/106. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2535216 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535216

Darren Rosenblum (Contact Author)

Pace Law School ( email )

78 North Broadway
White Plains, NY 10603
United States
914 422 4663 (Phone)

University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

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