Organizing Public Good Provision: Lessons from Managerial Accounting

International Review of Law and Economics, 2014, 42, 185–91

24 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2015 Last revised: 23 Jul 2018

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Stephen Hansen

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 2015

Abstract

This paper applies ideas and findings from Managerial Accounting to the problem of public good provision. It first links the problems of traditional bureaucracies with those of “discretionary expense centers”, which are characterized by poor user and supplier incentives as well as overproduction. It then describes alternative hybrid organizations that delegate authority and provide incentives on some dimensions, while maintaining control on others. Finally, it illustrates the ideas with several cross-country case studies on public registries, illustrating that such hybrids may provide a superior, if imperfect, solution to the problems that governments face when lacking sufficient information to directly control the activities of public goods’ providers.

Keywords: Public Good Provision, Managerial Accounting

JEL Classification: H40, M48

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito and Hansen, Stephen, Organizing Public Good Provision: Lessons from Managerial Accounting (April 2015). International Review of Law and Economics, 2014, 42, 185–91. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2535961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535961

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Stephen Hansen

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

10 Manor Rd
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 3UQ
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
91
rank
265,133
Abstract Views
442
PlumX