Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2536504
 
 

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Choice Architecture


Richard H. Thaler


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cass R. Sunstein


Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

John P. Balz


University of Chicago - Political Science Department

December 10, 2014

The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, Ch. 25, Eldar Shafir, ed. (2012).

Abstract:     
Decision makers do not make choices in a vacuum. They make them in an environment where many features, noticed and unnoticed, can influence their decisions. The person who creates that environment is, in our terminology, a choice architect. In this paper we analyze some of the tools that are available to choice architects. Our goal is to show how choice architecture can be used to help nudge people to make better choices (as judged by themselves) without forcing certain outcomes upon anyone, a philosophy we call libertarian paternalism. The tools we highlight are: defaults, expecting error, understanding mappings, giving feedback, structuring complex choices, and creating incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, Nudge, Psychology


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Date posted: December 13, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein, Cass R. and Balz, John P., Choice Architecture (December 10, 2014). The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, Ch. 25, Eldar Shafir, ed. (2012).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2536504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2536504

Contact Information

Richard H. Thaler
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-5208 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
John P. Balz
University of Chicago - Political Science Department ( email )
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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