Cross-Listing and Corporate Malfeasance: Evidence from P-Chip Firms
Posted: 14 Dec 2014 Last revised: 17 Apr 2018
Date Written: July 3, 2017
The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has resulted in a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation for P-chips' questionable practices, and discuss its implications.
Keywords: China's private sector; P-chips; Enforcement difficulty; Corporate malfeasance
JEL Classification: M41; G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation