Variable Remuneration of Executives (Las Retribuciones Variables De Los Directivos)

14 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2014

See all articles by Josep M. Rosanas

Josep M. Rosanas

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Date Written: October 1, 2013

Abstract

English Abstract: This paper discusses the variable remuneration systems that have come into wide use in recent years. The author highlights the role such systems have played in financial scandals and in the origins of the financial crisis, and examines John Roberts’s proposal on weak incentives, grounding it in aspects that are not quantitative or directly financial.

Spanish Abstract: El documento trata de los métodos de retribución variable que se han generalizado en los últimos tiempos. Pone de manifiesto el papel que han jugado en los escándalos financieros y en la gestación de la crisis y analiza la propuesta de John Roberts de incentivos débiles, fundamentándola en aspectos no cuantitativos ni directamente financieros.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

JEL Classification: M5, M14, M52

Suggested Citation

Rosanas, Josep M., Variable Remuneration of Executives (Las Retribuciones Variables De Los Directivos) (October 1, 2013). IESE Business School Working Paper No. WP-1077, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2537624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2537624

Josep M. Rosanas (Contact Author)

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
34 932534200 (Phone)
34 932534343 (Fax)

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