Agency as Principal

90 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2014

See all articles by Brigham Daniels

Brigham Daniels

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School

Date Written: April 1, 2014

Abstract

A presumption of a principal-agent relationship between the elected branches and the bureaucracy permeates administrative law and scholarship. This typical framework consistently casts agencies as agents, never principals. This Article challenges that assumption and explores the ways in which agencies can act as principals to the elected branches. Agencies, in fact, commonly manipulate the elected branches. The challenge posed by the Article to the typical understanding of the relationship between agencies and the elected branches not only provides a more nuanced understanding of the modern administrative state but also raises serious questions about administrative law, which regularly employs this same faulty assumption.

Suggested Citation

Daniels, Brigham, Agency as Principal (April 1, 2014). Georgia Law Review, Vol. 48, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2537842

Brigham Daniels (Contact Author)

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )

410 JRCB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
United States

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