Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets

62 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2014

See all articles by Tahir Andrabi

Tahir Andrabi

Pomona College - Department of Economics

Jishnu Das

Georgetown University; Georgetown University

Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP); Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 29, 2014

Abstract

We study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment and lower fees.

Keywords: Educational Markets, Information Provision, Private Schools, Market-level Experiments

JEL Classification: O12, I25, L15, L22, D22, D82

Suggested Citation

Andrabi, Tahir and Das, Jishnu and Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets (October 29, 2014). HKS Working Paper No. RWP14-052, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2538624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2538624

Tahir Andrabi (Contact Author)

Pomona College - Department of Economics ( email )

Claremont, CA 91711
United States
909-607-2513 (Phone)
909-621-8576 (Fax)

Jishnu Das

Georgetown University ( email )

O Street
Washington, DC 20057
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Georgetown University ( email )

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Asim Ijaz Khwaja

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
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United States
617-384-7790 (Phone)
617-496-5960 (Fax)

Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP) ( email )

Via Real Collegio, 30
Moncalieri, Turin 10024
Italy

Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) ( email )

Duke University
Durham, NC 90097
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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