Make-Up and Suspicion in Acquiring-a-Company. An Experiment Controlling for Gender and Gender Constellations

10 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2014

See all articles by Daniela Di Cagno

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Noemi Pace

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Date Written: December 13, 2014

Abstract

The privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. “Make-up” is measured by how much the true value is overstated, “Suspicion” by how much the price offer differs from the value message. Treatments vary in information about gender via (not) informing about the gender constellation and in embeddedness of gender information. Female participants engage more in “make-up”, i.e. overstate more the value of the company, but are not more “suspicious”. Furthermore, homogeneous female constellations make up more.

Keywords: bargaining, experiment, gender

JEL Classification: C78, C91, J16

Suggested Citation

Di Cagno, Daniela and Galliera, Arianna and Güth, Werner and Pace, Noemi and Panaccione, Luca, Make-Up and Suspicion in Acquiring-a-Company. An Experiment Controlling for Gender and Gender Constellations (December 13, 2014). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Working Paper Series No. 26/WP/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2539090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2539090

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome ( email )

00162 Rome, Roma
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.luiss.it/facolta/insegnamenti/curriculu

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano ( email )

Milan
Italy

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Noemi Pace (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

via Columbia 2
Rome, IA Rome 00133
Italy

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