Incentives in Internal Capital Markets: Capital Constraints, Competition, and Investment Opportunities

37 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2001

See all articles by Roman Inderst

Roman Inderst

Goethe University Frankfurt

Christian Laux

Vienna University of Economics and Business; Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: May 2001

Abstract

This paper considers the effect of competition for scarce financial resources on managers' incentives to generate profitable investment opportunities. Competition is only unambiguously beneficial if projects are symmetric. If divisions differ in their cash endowments or their growth potential, integration may reduce incentives for some managers, which may lower total firm value. Moreover, relaxing capital constraints, e.g., by integrating a cash cow project, may reduce incentives.

We treat two different scenarios where contracts can either only specify monetary incentives or additionally the allocation of funds. While distorted capital allocations increase managers' incentives, they only survive renegotiations in integrated firms.

Keywords: capital allocation, conglomerate discount

JEL Classification: G31, G34, J33

Suggested Citation

Inderst, Roman and Laux, Christian, Incentives in Internal Capital Markets: Capital Constraints, Competition, and Investment Opportunities (May 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=253965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.253965

Roman Inderst (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

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Germany
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HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/en/departments/finance/lehrstuhl/prof-dr-roman-inderst/team

Christian Laux

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF) ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, 1020
Austria

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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