Rangnummers en relatieve woningnood (Shadow Prices of Rent-Controlled Housing)

12 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2014

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 1995

Abstract

Dutch Abstract: De markt voor huurwoningen wordt beheerst door een uitgebreid stelsel van prijs- en vraagregulering. Dit werkstuk richt zich op de verklaring van verschillen in de hoogte van ingezette rangnummers bij het verkrijgen van huurwoningen in Amsterdam. Het blijkt dat de rangnummers fungeren als 'schaduwprijzen'. De hoogte van de schaduwprijzen is afhankelijk van locatiefactoren, met name toenemende percentages etnische minderheden, en huursubsidie.

English Abstract: The market for rental housing in The Netherlands is state regulated, notably by caps on rental prices. This paper attempts to explain differences in the length of time that individual allocation rights are held by members of housing cooperatives in Amsterdam before they exercise them. Length of time before exercise acts as a shadow price. These shadow prices are shown to depend on locational characteristics, in particular neighborhood racial transition, and rent assistance.

Note: Downloadable document is in Dutch.

Suggested Citation

De Wit, Dirk P.M., Rangnummers en relatieve woningnood (Shadow Prices of Rent-Controlled Housing) (1995). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2540090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540090

Dirk P.M. De Wit (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

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