Competition and Bank Opacity

54 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2014

See all articles by Liangliang Jiang

Liangliang Jiang

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Ross Levine

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2014

Abstract

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Liangliang and Levine, Ross Eric and Lin, Chen, Competition and Bank Opacity (December 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20760. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541536

Liangliang Jiang (Contact Author)

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

11 Yuk Choi Rd
Hung Hom
Hong Kong

Ross Eric Levine

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

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