College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea

40 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2014

See all articles by Christopher Avery

Christopher Avery

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Soohyung Lee

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Alvin E. Roth

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2014

Abstract

This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications.

Suggested Citation

Avery, Christopher and Lee, Soohyung and Roth, Alvin E., College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea (December 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20774. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541550

Christopher Avery (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4063 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Soohyung Lee

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.soohyunglee.com

Alvin E. Roth

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-5447 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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